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ABSTRACT

This document reports the results of a year-long study of the processes used successfully to manage policy in a medium-sized school district in Ontario, Canada. The study was subjective and qualitative, and involved three techniques: observing meetings and people at work, conducting interviews, and examining documentary material. The researchers assessed the impact on policy formation of trustees, senior administrators, other internal professionals, middle managers, union leaders, and knowledgeable outsiders. Formal and informal settings for policy consideration, from board meetings to social gatherings, were observed. The report describes the four major routes by which policy is formulated and discusses combinations of these routes. Mechanisms used in the district for maintaining control and cohesiveness in policy matters are delineated. The report concludes with an examination of the policy system's flexibility and of the implications of the study's findings for administrators and researchers. (Author/PGD)

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The Many Faces of Board Policy:

A Study of Creation and Control

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KEY TO ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CEO — Chief Executive Officer, in this jurisdiction, Mr. W. G. Beevor.

CODE — Commission on Declining Enrolment, a major and multi-faceted research project funded by the Government of Ontario.
The Lakehead Board also has an internal committee of decline.

Curriculum Policies — The following are the three major Provincial Curriculum Policies :
- PlJl Primary Junior, Grades K-6
- Il Intermediate level, Grades 7-10
- HSl High School level, Grades 9-13, overlaps with Il

"Feds" — The Teachers' Federations (read "unions"). Each is a local affiliate of a provincial association.
- OPSMTF Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation, generally teaching grades JK to 8.
- FWTAO Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario, generally also JK to 8.
- OSSTF Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, generally teaching grades 9-13.

Forces — Internal professional groups within the Lakehead Boards. These include the three federations, the Elementary Principals' Association and the Secondary Principals' Association. Other support groups are sometimes included.

LBE — The Lakehead Board of Education, the official name of the school jurisdiction.

MBO — Management by Objectives, a managerial system which seeks to simultaneously increase level of motivation and level of control.

MoE — The Ministry of Education for the Province of Ontario.

PB — Priority Budgeting, a program-based budgeting system in which each program is examined according to how it would function at 80, 90, 100 and 110 per cent of the prior year's budget.

PTR — Pupil-teacher ratio, not a limit on class size but a ratio computed over a whole school or the whole system.

ZBB	Zero-Based Budgeting, a program-based budgeting system in which each line item begins at zero funding and advocates must argue for levels deemed to be adequate.
ZIRT	Zone Implementation Resource Teams are comprised of classroom teachers with expertise in curriculum implementation.

PREAMBLE

What kind of organization can, at the close of the stressful seventies, produce this list of innovative, cohesive achievements?

1. A modified zero-based budgeting system which receives input from employees in all functional areas, all administrators, and the board.

2. An increase in relative share of resources for training in the face of a decline in real income.

3. Not only five years of peacefully resolved negotiations, but also introduction of a "single-team," problem-oriented collective bargaining process.

4. Attendance by over one hundred administrators and board members at three-day retreat workshops on conflict resolution and on creative problem-solving.

5. Development of a metapolicy to enhance both rationality and participation in the policy process.

6. Development of a flexible, workable five year plan in pursuit of relatively explicit public goals.

7. Rotation of middle management through departments in pursuit of variety and growth.

8. Reduction in plant capacity while preserving both existing jobs and customer acceptance.

9. Successful use of internal staff to solve many high-level technical problems, thus avoiding contracting-out costs and preserving employee mobility.

10. Concurrent regular use and follow-up of external consultants from Ontario, British Columbia, Massechusetts, Ohio, California, to acquire skills not locally available.

11. A semi-formal communications network involving the ubiquitous CEO in breakfast/lunch/dinner meetings with formal and informal leaders of all subsystems.

12. Development of a package of techniques to facilitate employee growth and training, including long and short paid leaves, generous conference assistance, easy access to unpaid leaves, several exchange programs, career development counselling, part-time and job-sharing plans, and a flexible deferred salary arrangements.

An unfamiliar audience would be unlikely to place such an organization anywhere in the public sector, let alone consider that it could belong to the stereotypically conservative educational establishment. Yet, The Lakehead Board of Education in Thunder Bay, Ontario evidences all of these attributes of a healthy, smoothly functioning organization. How did this come to be?

INTRODUCTION

"Policy is whatever governments do, or choose not to do." True, but not very helpful. Policy is viewed here as any formal decision, consistent non-decision, or not-formalized regular practice which meets Mann's (1975) criteria for policy problems. Policy problems are, according to Mann, (1) public in nature, (2) consequential, (3) complex, (4) embedded in uncertainty, and (5) reflective of a value component. Within this study the above definition was generally adhered to. The unit of analysis here is a single school district, and the purpose of the research was to better understand the process of policy making in that district.

This paper has modest objectives. It is based on a year-long field study of a medium-sized school district in Ontario, Canada. That school district is recognized by Canadian educators as being both innovative and effective, as evidenced by examples in the preamble above. With regard to policy (and practice), it is the cohesiveness, consistency, and high levels of shared

control which strike the observer. Consequently, the three objectives of this paper address these phenomena.

First, a description of the various rouces by which policy is formulated is presented. Second, an examination of particular mechanisms for maintaining control and cohesiveness follows. Third, a discussion of dilemmas and implications for administrators and researchers concludes the report.

Before proceeding to those sections, however, it is necessary to describe the methodology used and the context of the school district under study.

METHODOLOGY

From September, 1978 through April of 1979, three researchers devoted a total of about one FTE to the study of the Lakehead Board of Education (LBE hereafter). The administrators and school trustees, in that order, had given approval for the study and imposed no restrictions. Researchers chose to avoid direct observation of collective bargaining sessions, though Negotiations Policy Committee meetings of the LBE team were attended. Respondents appeared to be frank and thorough, and cross-checking of important points confirmed this.

The study was carefully conceived in order to assure a broad range of data and to check accuracy of all observations. Various levels were examined: trustees, senior administrators, other internal professionals, "middle management", union leaders, and knowledgeable outsiders. Varied settings assured representativeness: administrators' meetings, formal board meetings, trustee committees, joint committees, system-environment interactions, and

informal social settings. Triangulation of focus was assured by using three specific methods: observing meetings and people at work, interviewing, and examining documentary material. Also, confirming instances were obtained from other school jurisdictions by using similar methodology. The intent was to obtain a wholistic perspective and the author is reasonably satisfied in that regard.

While the methodology was certainly not unsystematic, it is nevertheless subjective and qualitative. Cusick (197) argues that the agreement of a researchers subjects with the observers "picture" of them is a strong validity test in such studies. When an interim report was presented to trustees and administrators in late 1979, that audience agreed that the findings constituted and adequate and accurate description of their organization.

There are some important limitations. Focus was on system-level variables — policy, its antecedents, and its consequences. For this reason and because of limited resources, there is little school level data. This limits both inference and implications.[1]

To the extent that outcomes depend on the behaviour of motivated actors, no study of policy processes is easily generalizable. However, given the near identical structures, environments, and missions of Ontario School districts, and similar ones in other provinces and states, this study can, at very least, raise questions which are useful and interesting in other jurisdictions.

Also, this study informs some specific issues raised by others: (a) control of policy by the CEO and bureaucratic elites, (b) fear of teacher "takeover" of policy through collective bargaining, and (c) identification of coupling mechanisms.

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[1] The author has taught educators from the LBE system at preservice and graduate levels for four years. Supervision of student teachers from 1975-79 allowed access to many schools, albeit for different purposes. The author is also a member of several informal networks which include school-based professionals. Thus, while there was limited formal focus on school-level outcomes in this study, the author is not uninformed in that regard.

CONTEXT

Setting

The Lakehead Board of Education serves the City of Thunder Bay, Ontario. The city of 112,000 is quite isolated, being roughly nine hundred miles from Toronto, over four hundred from Winnipeg and Sault Ste. Marie, and two hundred miles Northeast of Duluth. The Lakehead Board serves about 22,000 students from junior kindergarden (JK) through Grade 13. Thunder Bay was formed in 1970 when the Province imposed amalgamation on two cities, Port Arthur and Fort William. The two respective school boards had been amalgamated one year earlier.

The Provincial Presence in Education

Education in Ontario is highly centralized in several ways. The Ministry of Education provides 58% of total funding, certifies both teachers and administrators, maintains regional offices to "review" implementation of policy, has potentially unlimited control of curriculum, and even exercises considerable de facto control of research through its ability to pay for definitive answers to its own questions. Specific examples of provincial influence will be examined throughout this report. What is surprising, in

view of such potential power, is the small degree to which the province impinges on the day-to-day operations of school jurisdictions in Ontario. The Ministry is contextual, only occasionally intrusive.

In fact, the real influence of the Ministry has recently fluctuated. From a very centralist stance prior to 1965 (approximately), that agency went through a period of a decentralist philosophy during the progressive and well-financed period of the late sixties. Since then, the Ministry has tightened controls on curriculum and finance while reducing its share of education costs. In spite of this appearance of recentralization, provincial control has not been successfully retracted for several reasons. First, the 1969 amalgamation of school boards created larger units which are more politically powerful and less in need of Ministry services. Second, the teachers collective bargaining legislation (Bill 100) allows open scope bargaining at the board level. Thus, many crucial issues are decided via local negotiations rather than by central fiat. Third, the Ministry is also financially constrained and is hard pressed to find staff to operationalize its centralist philosophies. Fourth, the present Progressive Conservative (PC) government has been in a minority position since 1975 and is, therefore, politically vulnerable, less likely to risk antagonizing any major sector of the voting populace. For these and other similar reasons, the very large legal power of the Provincial Ministry of Education remains a potential not actualized.

Local History

Local events are more important. The provincially imposed amalgamation of 1970 is still remembered. The constituent school boards were amalgamated a year earlier. In the early years, there was concern that positions in the "new" unit be balanced, that no incumbent administrator (for example) receive a significant demotion or loss of pay. This "new" administration, already considered top-heavy by some respondents, attempted to grow further in the early and mid-seventies. By 1974-75, there was agreement among staff, middle-management, and informed outsiders that the organization was closed, static, unresponsive. Still, the seeds of change were already sown.

Several separate events set up the almost inevitable changes of the late seventies. First, there was already a slow influx of more moderate, progressive trustees. Second, a long, angry, divisive strike in 1974-75 demonstrated both the dissatisfaction of the teachers and the dangers of a paternalistic approach to labour relations. Third, the aftermath of the strike caused additional progressive trustees to run and win election on a "healing, cooperative" platform. Fourth, a commissioned evaluation by an external team of consultants reaffirmed the problems alluded to above. Fifth, three highly competent and change-oriented senior administrators were hired in 1975-76, paving the way for new styles. Sixth, the incumbent Director of Education was overruled by trustees on two major issues, one a personnel matter and the second a plan to increase administrative staff. His retirement followed. This provided an opportunity for a major redirection.

The search for a new CEO reflected the new priorities. There was wide participation in defining the position. The search was very broad; no "insiders" were seriously considered. Interviewing was thorough with much involvement. W. Beevor was selected and took office as of July, 1976.

It is important to reiterate the constraints which operated. The 1974-75 conflict could not recur. The new trustee norm favoured participation, wide involvement, more community input, enhanced image, decisiveness, innovation and peaceful resolution of conflict. On the other hand, there had been little action taken to deal with the effects of declining enrolments and diminishing provincial share of costs. Thus leadership also needed to be decisive and willing to make necessary but unpopular decisions. The new CEO has functioned strongly in these and in many other issues. However, it is important to note both the climate and the problems which faced the organization at his entry in 1976. It is perhaps facetious but informative to state that, "If Wally Beevor did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent him". That is, given the environment in 1976, a candidate much different from the one chosen would not have been appropriate and would not have been seriously considered.

The Environment

This study provides a picture of The Lakehead Board of Education in 1978-79, four years after the strike and three years after the change in CEO.

The notions of cohesiveness and control pervade this report. In order to help the reader appreciate the reasons for this author's somewhat affectionate stance in that regard, it is useful to examine the environment in which LBE is embedded.



FIGURE 1: THE TURBULENT FIELD ENVIRONMENT OF L.B.E.

(NEAR-ENVIRONMENT SHOWN SEPARATED FROM LARGER ENVIRONMENT)

LBE can be usefully viewed as a complex system operating within a "turbulent field" environment. (Emery and Trist, 1962). In such an environment a system competes for finite resources. On one level, it competes with other members of the same "industry", such as colleges, universities, and other boards. On another level, LBE and other members of the industry compete with other public sector priorities and with the private sector for finite citizen dollars. In a turbulent field, the relations between systems, the very rules of the game, constantly shift. Thus, while there is real competition among members of the industry, LBE's, "near-environment", members must keep the industry as a whole healthy with regard to the rest of the environment (see Figure 1).

Thus one seeks to share costs and benefits with a university rather than compete. One negotiates the program boundaries with a college "within the family", not in front of the MoE as referee. Or, one competes publically with MoE only after internal channels fail, and victories are quietly savoured, not publicly flaunted. This cohesiveness - while always tenuous and dynamic - is necessary to survival in such an environment.

Internally, LBE behaves similarly (see Figure 2). The five "forces",[2] conflict. The number of possible coalitions is finite, but quite large. Yet there is never a "fight to the death" between sub-systems - nor should there be. Within limits, the notion of a turbulent field environment validates the LBE preference for internal, peaceful, managed resolution of conflict, and for high levels of cohesiveness and control.

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[2]These include the three teachers' federations (O.S.S.T.F., O.P.S.M.T.F., F.W.T.A.O., and the elementary and secondary principals' associations.



FIGURE 2: THE SUBSYSTEMS OF L.B.E.

BY LEVELS SUGGESTED BY PARSONS, QUOTED IN THOMPSON, 1967

CONCERNING THE CONTROL OF POLICY

The specific focus here is on policy. In that regard, the organization is highly cohesive, consistent and controlled. This situation is viewed by the writer as necessary and desirable, within limits. The balance of this report will be devoted to a description of mechanisms for achieving this state and to consideration of implications thereof. It is necessary at this point, however, to describe the writer's biases toward the organization's general stance.

I find no discomfort - personal or scholarly - with the notion of control, or with what I perceive to be high degrees of control over policy in this organization. The key to that stance is contained in this assumption: Control is not a zero-sum game.

Let us first accept that a totally laissez-faire organization is not likely to be very successful in the kind of environment faced by LBE. Given that, there must be some locus of control within the organization. Stereotypically, educational organizations often exhibit the pattern of control over policy shown in figure 3.



FIGURE 3: "TYPICAL" SCHOOL DISTRICT CONTROL PATTERN

In this situation, administrators have major control over policy. This occurs because they have more expertise, time and experience with the issues about which policy decisions are made. Given that administrators are paid to evidence these characteristics, one cannot be a priori critical unless these powers are used to exclude other legitimate stakeholders. In fact, that often occurs, but it does not have to be so.

High levels of administrative control need not imply low control by others. To the degree that others invest energy and time, and accumulate expertise (and power), they can exert control without diminishing the administrators' role. Tannenbaum (1968) has found many organizations in which

participants from several levels perceive that they have high levels of control over outcomes. These organizations function better in many ways than others which are preceived to be more centralized! Consistent with this picture, one can conceive LBE as exhibiting the pattern of control shown in figure 4.



FIGURE 4: CONTROL PATTERNS IN THE LAKEHEAD BOARD

These diagrams are not based on quantifiable data. They are used only to illustrate the relatively high levels of participation, input, and control available to trustees, administrators, and system professionals. The data gathered support that assertion at least in a qualitative way.

At this point the specific routes available for policy formulation will be described. Following that, the mechanisms by which the high levels of control are achieved will be discussed.

ROUTES TO POLICY

There are four major routes for policy formation, and there are also examples of hybridization.

1. Provincial Imposition Examples include core curriculum, imminent mandatory special education, certification requirements, length of school year and day, among others.

2. Economic Rationality Examples generally have to do with provincial funding, as in special education and junior kindergarten; some are relatively local issues such as closure of schools.

3. Committee Process The bulk of policy follows this route, e.g., role descriptions, gifted children, five-year plans, and principals' rotation.

4. Negotiations Many de facto policies emerge from negotiations or are at least formalized there, e.g., PTR, some leave policies, some job security provisions.

5. Hybrids Often, two or more processes are combined. For example, committees or staff will identify issues which are resolved or legitimized in the contract.

Some elucidation is required.

Provincial Imposition

Provincially imposed policies are of indirect interest here because of the ways in which LBE responds. Recently, separate new curriculum guidelines for grades JK-6 (Primary-Junior) and grades 7-10 (Intermediate) were developed by the provinces Ministry of Education (MoE). Within the Lakehead

Board, committees with broad vertical and horizontal representation were used to develop implementation plans. There are no permanent central consultants, so work was done by classroom teachers and administrators. Often, teachers receive special training to prepare themselves for these leadership roles. The committees, and specific implementation teams, assist other teachers in making needed changes. This provides visibility and temporary upward mobility for the persons selected to handle the implementation. Such attention to participation and rewards is typical.

Hillcrest High School, one of ten secondary schools in the jurisdiction, has, for several years, used a semester system based on sixty minute modules. Ministry credit requirements assume a seventy-two minute module. Recent Provincial policy made transfer of Hillcrests' fractional (.85) course credits difficult. The Provincial Ministry pressured Hillcrest to change. For nearly two years, the decision was fought through formal interagency channels, to no avail. School staff, parents, LBE administrators, and eventually trustees, became increasingly insistant and sought to approach the Minister directly. An article supporting Hillcrest serendipitously appeared in the provinces most influential newspaper, the Toronto Globe and Mail. Concurrently, a new Deputy-Minister took office. In the absence of the Minister, the new Deputy agreed with the LBE delegation that a third party evaluation was appropriate. That evaluation documented the quality and advantages of Hillcrest's deviant system, and the Ministry agreed to continuation.

This mini-case-in instructive in two respects. First, the internal membership of LBE slowly - over two years - formed a very determined coalition. Such cohesiveness is typical, and is not built by chance. Second, rather than exploit their small "victory" egoistically, the LBE stance has been to praise the rationality and flexibility of the Ministry. This attention to management of inter- and intra-organizational conflict is also a recurring theme in LBE activities.

Economic Rationality

Within special education funding arragements, the greatest net return on LBE investment occurs at the maximum grant position. This allows the creation of the most teacher jobs at the least local cost. Junior kindergarten funding is similarly exploited to the maximum available enrolment. This "maximum/grant position" is an unwritten fiscal policy; there is no educational rationale or research re special education showing that this level matches measured need.[3] It is worth noting that French instruction funds have not been similarly exploited to maximum level. It is not clear to this observer whether the latter decision relates to need, demand, elite preference, or fear of political stress in the community.

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[3] LBE operates well above provincial ceilings for general grant revenue, and does so, in my opinion, with real efficiency. Thus the above discussion should not be construed as implying any general practice of unreasonable frugality or inattention to educational needs.

Several school closures have occurred and economic reasons are clearly at the heart of these. Thorough studies of costs vs. facilities are available and are used. During my time "on-site", some shift of public stance from economic to educational considerations was evident as LBE sought to justify closures to parents. These closures were accomplished with high levels of participation but, as they progressed, associated conflicts diminished and became much more controlled. For each school committees including parents, school staff, and central office personnel were created to examine the need for closure and to plan alternative school choices for students.

Traditional Committee Process

Recently, LBE adopted a metapolicy[4], essentially a mapping of legitimate entry points and processes for analysing policy initiatives. All system members are now supposed to be aware of these channels. Before adopting the metapolicy, entry points were not fixed, or at least were fixed only by tradition. Commonly, a policy issue identified by administration would come to the Board or to a standing committee (Education or Resources Management) for initial reaction. Further development by administration, standing committee, or ad hoc committee might follow. External input (from professional staff, community, Ministry) might be obtained. The resulting proposed policy would then go back to a standing committee and would subsequently receive full board approval.

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[4] Note, in this regard, the work of Lorne Downey (1977) who consulted with the LBE committee who developed their metapolicy from Downey's model.

Clearly, policies could be sent back "up the line" for revision at any time. Initiation could come from trustees, or from professionals or outsiders, usually through presentation of an issue to trustees. Many informal processes could operate concurrently. More than one committee could have an interest in the developing policy.[5]

While this seems complex and even unwieldly, in fact there was clear understanding of the process and few deviations. Procedures for hiring were, for example, initiated by administration and were referred back to them for revision. Another administration-initiated policy regarding the rotation of principals was approved with a minimum number of steps. Typically, such policies receive formal and informal input from all five "forces", though this is discretionary.

On two occasions, French Immersion and the Gifted and Talented Program, interest groups sought to short-circuit the committee process, seeking an "on the spot" policy commitment from trustees. The fact that these were rebuffed and referred back through the committee route suggests that practices were relatively unambiguous, even if they were not made explicit in any written form. The meta-policy which was developed and adopted last year confirmed and formalized these steps, but did not cause major changes in the process.

It is important to note that two major activities, the budget and the five-year plan, receive broad input, intensive administrative development, and proceed through a process similar to that described above. These - and most policy issues - involve wide participation, high visibility and considerable technical input.

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[5] A fictional but instructive example of the complexity of this process is provided on page 29 in a discussion of the CEO's role with regard to a hybrid policy route.

Collective Bargaining

Several issues, some in fact below the policy level, have been resolved through collective bargaining. These include pupil-teacher ratio, secondary "job security" provisions, and a variety of other working conditions. I will avoid further issue-by-issue description here and will attend to two other features.

First, the contract does reduce administrative discretion. On several occasions, senior administrators abandoned ideas because (1) the contract disallowed the activity or (2) they feared future negotiations would entrench or exclude the activity. For example, currently an attempt is being made to provide for more mobility in the secondary school department head positions. While elected trustees could legally impose a solution, there is concern that such actions would cause deterioration in labour relations. The reduction and management of conflict is a serious priority within this organization, so leaders seek to avoid either (1) creating a conflict which could spread to other issues or (2) having a solution entrenched in the contract. One informed quote suffices: "Seventy-five per cent of the policies of this board are under collective agreement". To some extent then, the "traditional" trustee fear of teacher control of policy, of erosion of "management rights", is realized in the Lakehead Board of Education.

Second, one could argue that many issues which have relevance for the well-being of the whole organization should not be settled via the gamesmanship that often accompanies bargaining. In fact, a wide range of respondents

believe that Lakehead Board of Education's problem-oriented bargaining technique does encourage thorough research and rational, wholistic decisions. I do not have enough information to test that perception, but I certainly have no evidence to dispute it.

Hybrids

Some policy initiatives proceed concurrently through more than one channel. Most commonly, some question will be under study for a standing or ad hoc committee, while at the same time, the collective bargaining channel is also being made ready for action. For example, Lakehead teachers now have a deferred salary plan by which a teacher can take only 80% of salary each year over four years, and will then have a fifth year free of duties at the same salary. The intent is to reduce the need for lay-offs of teachers due to declining enrolment. This small but innovative policy issue was a product of activity in several channels.

Informally, the CEO suggested the idea to members of a master degree class when he was doing a guest lecture. That class contained a member of the secondary teachers negotiating team and a member of their unions executive. Another negotiator reported that informal discussions were held between the CEO and other senior union members.

Three committees also discussed the plan. The Redundancy Committee and the Teacher-Board Education Committee did so, as did the Negotiations Policy Committee of the Board. The Superintendent who acts as chief negotiator for the Board was instrumental in the plan's development. When

the committees and informal routes had had enough time to build a consensus that the plan was desirable, it was shunted into the contract channel and a fast, easy agreement resulted. In this way the contract acts as a "fast-track" for policies and practices which are needed more quickly than would be possible via the committee route. Also, such contractual action to legitimize internal consensus avoids debate in public. Other innovative responses to decline related to saving, sharing, or enriching jobs have followed similar multiple paths.

It is worth noting that the newly approved LBE meta-policy can describe and constrain only the major route to policy, the Committee Process. This does not diminish the importance of that activity; but it does remind us that other routes to formal or de facto policy are workable and legitimate.

Summary

There are four regular routes to policy output: provincial imposition, economic rationality, committee process, and negotiations. Often hybrid routes combining two or more of the above operate. The mechanisms appear to be varied, but in fact the actors are common and the outputs are consistent. Policies are mutually reinforcing and cumulative. There are several reasons for this consistency, several "mechanisms for control". Some are intended and some merely evolved; some are explicit, others unobstrusive. Identification of these has been interesting and rewarding. A description and discussion of these will now be presented.

CONTROL MECHANISMS

Cohesiveness and control of policy (at least) is not achieved by chance. On the other hand, it is not likely that each of the following mechanisms was rationally designed in pursuit of a single "master plan". Rather, each evolved in a way which is consistent with (1) the needs and styles described in the "Context and History" section, and (2) the demands of the environment as described above. Some are structural, some behavioural, and some attitudinal or cultural.

Goals

In the 1975-76 school year, broad community and professional participation was invited as LBE developed its public goals. The visibility and participation itself enhanced the organization's image. In fact the goals were never referred to in any meeting I attended. Still, they serve as a check if anyone chooses to "enforce" them regarding any specific policy or practice.

Conflict

Reduction and management of conflict has been referred to above. Literally thousands of dollars and hours have been expended to increase skills of trustees, administrators, and "forces" in this area. At the board table, issues are talked to consensus if at all possible - even a weak consensus is usually preferable to a close public vote. Trustees report loyalty to a

decision once taken, even if they opposed it earlier. Conflict in the media is, to understate, discouraged. On occasion, trustees violate these norms. Such deviants are met by "blank stares" (trustee quote) or by simple, consistent non-reward: no chairmanships, for example. This norm is unambiguous.[5]

Single-Team Bargaining

In brief, both negotiating teams seek to identify and solve problems. Each individual has a veto over items. After three years, innovative contracts and peace in the labour relations areas continue. This strategy seeks to turn conflict into creativity by focusing on shared problems rather than on differences. The local O.S.S.T.F. executive is perhaps closer, philosophically, to LBE trustees than to its provincial association. The converse is certainly true for LBE trustees.[6] Single-team bargaining is responsive to the environment of the organization in that (1) it seeks to prevent recurrence of the 1974-75 conflict, and (2) it recognizes that the health of the whole system is crucial to long-term well-being and sub-systems. Crudely, one does not "fight to the death".

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[5] This response is not. An argumentative trustee can be coopted (Gouldner, 1954) by being elevated to a more senior position, hopefully to become a committed insider rather than an antagonist.

[6] There is an unintended but perhaps not unpredicted consequence here. As O.S.S.T.F. leaders work more closely with trustees, the former are subject to being seen by their general membership as having "sold out". The same is true for other teacher groups, and was confirmed by interview.

Trustee Socialization

In the formal process, new trustees undergo over thirty hours of information/indoctrination provided by senior trustees, administrators, and system professionals. Less formally, the "blank stares" at the board table are an unsubtle teaching tool. Also, the post-board-meeting sessions at various clubs and restaurants are serious and useful activities. I observed one exemplary session in which an apparently "right-wing" trustee and the O.S.S.T.F. president - in public conflict hours before - came to understand and respect each other's views in an informal hour. The Director and his potentially major protagonist resolve more conflict after midnight than can be generated before. There is a sincere respect for others feelings among the organization's elite - and a complementary effort to inculcate the organizations values. Thus, there are several socialization processes. Some are explicit; some less so.

Committees

Almost all trustees have intense committee involvement. Most committees also include administrators and several include other professional staff. At least ten committees met from fifteen to forty-five hours last year. Standing Committees may require more time, especially of chairmen. The crucial issue is this: <u>each committee is a potential channel for dealing with</u>

a policy problem. One or more committees may combine with informal networks and the negotiations process to identify and refine solutions. Thus, as alluded to above re "hybrids", there are multiple, redundant channels for solving policy level problems. There is a richly connected system operating. If one channel fails, others - formal or informal - may succeed.

One potentially explosive issue regarding secondary level administrative positions is being discussed by at least three groups (with overlapping memberships). Thus, when one route to solution fails, there are still many options to explore before open conflict becomes inevitable. To this outsider, this process appears to be both appropriate and successful. Most members of the system are connected to most others via several routes. Somehow, in LBE this serves to enhance the probability of creative solutions without increasing the chance of an irrevocable veto. The "why" is not clear, but it probably resides in the shared assumptions, multiple channels, and in the activities of the ubiquitous CEO.

Five-Year Plan

Each year, a five-year plan of major activities is prepared by administration after input (formal and informal) from trustees and "forces". After board approval - generally with little amendment - this document is treated as a set of policy commitments. Specific implementation activities become a part of the goal packages of administrators. The plan is then available for use by administration as a control mechanism. For example, if a trustee raises an issue which already appears in, say, year three,

administration can deflect trustee attempts to require immediate, reactive action. This protects administration from being easily "deprioritized". It similarly allows trustees to postpone reaction to interest groups, if they choose. The plans are comprehensive and clear, yet not too complex, and they were observed to serve as real, useable guides to long-term goal achievement.

The Budget Process

Since budget is applied policy making, observation of that process is necessary here. The Priority Budgeting (PB) process, a modified form of ZBB, certainly seeks to increase rationality in decision making. Formal input is elicited from all forces. Administrators met for more than forty hours, and had to prepare for each meeting. Discussion was not wholly devoid of personal preference, but for the most part was informed, professional, effective. Trustees spent five additional, lengthy, meetings before passage. Many predicted that the process would collapse at the end and that trustee preferences would outweigh other considerations. In fact there were very few examples of that; the high commitment to the PB process was not seriously compromised.

Meta-Policy

Again, broad input, thorough committee work, outside expertise, and strong administrative support created a package which was enthusiastically accepted by the Board. The "new" process does not change much, but it does formalize and give visibility to the major route of policy development. It

gives all parties access to the formal rules of the policy "game", and should enhance the real and perceived control of all participants. It is worth noting that existing high degrees of administrative control are institutionalized in that policy.[8]

Community

Community input typically comes from single-issue interest groups. Some are broad issues (French, Gifted, Handicapped) and some are highly specific (John Street School, Francis Street School). On rare occasions, outsiders sit on committees (Driver Education). According to Pross (1975) single-issue groups often mature and become institutionalized. They develop broader interests, ongoing formal and informal communication links, and are asked for input "before the fact". This maturation has not occurred in the school-based groups, and I observed no effort to encourage their development. The control mechanism operating here is the practice of not unnecessarily increasing community input, not intentionally seeking a wider range of viewpoints.

The Ubiquitous CEO

A whole report could easily be written on the influence of the CEO, Mr. Wally Beevor. I will pursue imagery rather than formality and will describe three roles: "the magpie role", "the agricultural model", and control

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[8] I don't believe that general adherence to the metapolicy will or should exclude use of other routes to policy. In a complex environment like that of LBE, the richness and flexibility of their multiple routes are attributes to be valued.

of premises of decision.

In the magpie role the CEO finds and brings home ideas, skills, concepts, people. He is truly curious and personally warm; any meeting with his peers or externals is a cause for conversation, proving, and learning. The organization is well served, given the contributions of W. Beevor's contacts: Berkowitz, Downey, King, University of Michigan, and N.T.L., among others.

The agricultural model is a name suggested by several respondents who described Beevor's behaviour as follows: "He has an idea. He can't do it himself, so he 'plants' the idea." What occurs is this. Recall the notion of multiple redundant channels. When the CEO has a problem or an idea, he "plants" it in several places, nutures it occasionally, and usually finds that in one or more channels the idea takes root and matures. There are two prerequisites: (1) the existence of a network of multiple formal and informal channels, and (2) a very active CEO who can identify and use these channels. Let me present a fictitious scenerio about the selling an idea X.

Mon. Feb. 1 - lunch:	Beevor mentions idea X to Superintendent Truelove, it has relevance for Teacher-Board Education Committee.
Tues. Feb. 2-a.m.:	Beevor drops idea X in discussion with Chair McLeod and Vice-Chair Griffis.
Tues. Feb. 2-p.m.:	Over coffee after the Board Meeting, Beevor suggests X to Trustee Tocheri.
Wed. Feb. 3-p.m.:	CODE meeting; in a visit to this committee Beevor includes idea X in a list of suggestions.
Thurs. Feb. 4-p.m.:	At a community function, Beevor and Trustee Polonsky meet and talk shop, including X.
Mon. Feb. 8-dinner:	Idea X mentioned to federation presidents.
Tues. Feb. 9-class at the University:	Idea X included in talk to a masters class in educational administration with several teachers present.
Tues. Feb.9-p.m.:	Relevance of idea X to Negotiations Policy Committee is suggested to trustee members at break during a meeting of another standing committee.

Thurs. Feb. 11-a.m.: O.S.S.T.F. President, Gothard phones Truelove about another matter and X is discussed.

... and the seed begins to grow.

Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon suggests that an effective way to influence decisions (e.g., policy decisions) is to control the premises of decision-making. Means of influencing premises follow, with examples. The central idea is that certain practices will render some thoughts almost unthinkable, others nearly unavoidable.

a) Organizational vocabulary focuses members along some themes: risk, openness, trust, attribution, "I have no problem with that", feedback, consensus, meta-policy, goal package, "turtles under rocks", "call a spade a shovel", core facility, accountability, ownership.

b) Selection of incumbents, i.e. screening, reduces disonance. Witness the formalized, centralized procedures for appointing principals.

c) Reward systems. Charles Perrow (1972) suggests that the fastest way to announce new priorities is to make a visible promotion. Promotions and perquisites given to six very loyal and normatively compliant teachers constitute a clear message regarding what behaviours will be rewarded.

d) Access to communication channels defines ones ability to know, to consider, to influence. Beevor has increased incoming channels (see "Magpie" discussion). Staff, administrators, and trustees are encouraged to speak, meet, present, visit, and learn widely - but most of these activities somehow manage to be consistent with the CEO's own (very broad) interests and priorities. I personally believe that the large travel and P.D. budgets are among the best investments of the organization.

e) Relatively explicit public goals provide a frame of reference for all activity.

f) Training also focuses energy. Much is provided, but it is typically consistent with the CEO's and trustees styles. There are filtering systems to assure this. Major "trainers" have typically been identified by Beevor. Both trustees and professional staff have access to several such experiences. The new trustees are socialized (i.e., taught the language, the history, and the norms) formally by the extensive Trustee Orientation Program and informally by their peers.

The CEO's role in the informal socialization process is only indirect; trustees enforce their own norms.

g) By creating information. Generally through research, the CEO and central staff can influence others' decisions. One board member described a budget item in which "He (Beevor) didn't say 'Well we have to have this, and here are the consequences', but he kept bringing it back with more and more information. This is their method of applying pressure and ... its more subtle".

There are others but the point is made. The CEO (and all senior staff, to be a significant degree) has unquestionally enlarged the range of known options by these processes, but they are clearly consistent with his own style. They should be - he is paid for that kind of decisive leadership.

There is a secondary reason for raising these points in detail. The CEO in this jurisdiction is well-known for his calm, charismatic "Theory Y" style. There is danger that observers may infer that the style causes the successful outcomes. In fact, W. Beevor is an intuitively skilled manipulator of structural variables which complement and greatly extend the influence of his people-oriented leadership style. To overfocus on his extensive human interaction skills is to seriously underrate his skills - and his power.

Shared Assumptions

A great deal of the cohesiveness of the organization, particularly among administrators and trustees, is a result of an apparent shared culture. That is, several important beliefs seem to be shared by members of these groups

and by formal and informal leaders of the professional staff.[9] After several months of observing and interviewing, I believe the following are treated as universally shared assumptions. Not all share all assumptions, but the organization behaves as if these were true.

1. This is a child-centred board.
2. The classroom process is proceeding adequately under the guidance of professionals who are, with rare exception, competent and concerned.
3. Staff are "Theory Y" people: they seek growth, responsibility, participation, high competence.
4. Trustees make the final decisions.
5. Conflict is dangerous and should be managed/reduced/eliminated. Public conflict (board table, media) is especially undesirable.
6. Increased participation in decision-making leads to increased commitment and consequent improved performance.
7. Administrators are honest, competent, open.
8. Internal data (often subjective) are adequate for decision-making.
9. External ideas and exotic skills are nevertheless useful.
10. Low levels of conflict and high levels of morale are causally associated with high quality performance at the classroom level.
11. Trustees adequately represent the community.

For each assumption, there will be some dissenters. Again I emphasize that the behaviour of the organization as a whole proceeds as if these were universal. These values serve, therefore, as a control mechanism in that policy initiatives which were in violation of these would have little chance of adoption.

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[9] One can hardly resist playing "chicken or egg?" here. Could conflict-oriented teacher and principal leaders have been successful and influential given the values of their superiors and the environment of the organization?

Summary

These are the major mechanisms by which the observed cohesiveness and consistency are achieved. It was stated earlier that the researcher believes this to be a desirable situation, within limits. (This curious reader might find it interesting that most of these have developed since the arrival of the new CEO in 1976). However, like rewards, these tools and other processes described earlier have two edges. Therefore, in the next section, some potential unintended consequences of policy-related activities are examined.

DILEMMAS

How long is the road from cohesiveness to atrophy? At what point do behaviours and practices which are clearly desirable at one point in time become maladaptive? How does the organization allow for continual renewal? This report does not offer solutions, but it will identify some situations in which the questions are pertinent.

To this point we see an organization which is highly controlled, cohesive, and internally consistent. The turbulent field environment necessarily requires some degree of these characteristics. Yet all paths walked imply "roads not taken". In this section I will examine some choices made, and some possible consequences thereof.

Anticipatory vs Post Facto Response

One can conceive of a dichotemy of responses to environmental stress (e.g. legislation, decline, political pressure, economy). Such responses can be either anticipatory or post facto (See Figure 5). That is, an organizations leaders can anticipate problems and allocate resources in advance, or they can wait until the "wolf is at the door". It is a "Planning vs Problem Solving" dichotemy. Often, one is achieved at the cost of the other. LEE plans well, thoroughly, but flexibly. Anticipatory responses are common and appear to be effective. On the other hand, there is attention focussed on building up expertise to handle smaller problems that cannot be anticipated. The generous P.D. Fund and the extensive Leadership Development program exemplify this. Thus LEE solves the dilemma by policy level attention to both anticipatory and post facto capability. As resources become increasingly scarce, it will require serious commitment to continue this dual strategy.

FIGURE 5:
ANTICIPATORY VS POST-FACTO RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS

Adaptive vs Proactive Response

One can also dichotomize responses to stress as to whether they are adaptive (reactive) or proactive. The adaptive response re Hillcrest High School would have been compliance, thus changing the organization. The proactive response chosen was to attack the requirement, to reach out into the environment and change it. To use another example, to attempt socialization of new trustees ia adaptive; to attempt to influence who was elected would be proactive. I observed few proactive behaviours. It is probable that the environment of the eighties will require more proactive responses, e.g. more and more stable coalitions with members of the near environment.[10]



FIGURE 6:
ADAPTIVE VS PROACTIVE RESPONSES
TO ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS

Frames of Reference

Shared assumptions were described earlier, as were the shared conceptual frameworks resulting from CEO control of premises of decision-making. Such consensus contributes to goal achievement and to organizational survival. Yet each frame of reference which is widely adopted excludes other ways of describing reality.

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[10] To adapt uses up expertise and resources, and over time will actually change the nature of the organization. This decreases its ability to achieve rational goals; mere survival takes up all resources.

For example, W. Beevor explained to one external consultant that motivation was one of six priorities decided on for leadership development in the next few years. Interpreting this as a suggestion that system leaders be trained in this area via workshops or seminars - the consultant's major tool - the latter was unenthused. Yet the same consultant explained to me months later that he agreed that motivation was indeed a very useful area. If one views leadership development only as something which happens in three-day workshops, an important priority would be missed. (The LBE long-range plan for leadership development does allow for short courses, medium-length study leave, and even for extended leave to learn about such approved topics.)

Recall the earlier discussion which argued that the CEO is successful by skilfully combining several levels of intervention, from leader style to time management to reward system to MBO to training to structure to ... This considerable variety of input maintains a healthy variety of outlooks, but over time there is danger that today's novel approaches will become comfortable, traditional, and not subject to challenge.

Trustee socialization raises a similar concern. Reasonable homogeneity enhances goal achievement. Yet where is the provision for renewal? What strategies are used to intentionally nurture conflicting points of view, other frames of reference? Within limits, "randomness is good for an organization!"

Turnover

It may be that normal electoral turnover and retirement (including administration) will introduce "enough" healthy dissension. Turnover, if too slow, can become problematic, however. Iannacone (1967) has some empirical evidence to show that governments (read "schools boards") tend to begin in tune with the environment and then slowly drift out of touch.



FIGURE 7: IANNACCONE'S MODEL OF DRIFT AND RESPONSE

When the distance reaches a critical point, there is a short, violent "course correction", e.g. a very large electoral turnover. This would suggest that regular turnover is insufficient. However, Iannacone operates in a different (US) context; patterns in Canada are not necessarily identical. Clearly, high participation in elections by both candidates and electors should enhance representativeness. On the other hand, the effectiveness of trustee socialization efforts serves to blunt the sharp edge of change.

Measuring Reality

Except in those rare issues in which quantitative economic rationality is appropriate (e.g. closures), I observe that LBE measures of need - of environment - are either (a) very subjective, personal, intuitive, or (b) filtered through internal and external interest groups (e.g. "forces"). Often, both occur simultaneously. For example,"the situation analysis" which formed the basis for revising the five-year plan was highly qualitative and internally based. The J.K. evaluation of a few years ago was similarly subjective.

The problem is that such measures lead to drift away from "real" needs. The dilemma is that quantification is expensive, often suspect. One can waste resources creating sophisticated measurements of what is self-evident. The increasing influence of research and planning is seen, however, as a useful and reasonable activity in this regard. An organization which is so cohesive faces real danger if measures of its environment are inaccurate. To the extent that control mechanisms filter reality or serve to create on enacted environment, they may carry the seeds of their own demise.

The Children

There is a perception among several trustees that concern with teacher issues (redundancy, morale) has displaced attention to child-centered issues. I have no measures of validity; I do have documentation of the concern. One endemic problem is that curricular success is often longer term, less

measurable and less visible. Given the bargaining power of teachers and their legitimate concerns, dominance of such themes may be inevitable. But there may be a limit to community tolerance for apparent de-emphasis on child-centered issues.

Division of Labour

At times, contentious and ambiguous issues become shuttlecocks. Trustees want administrators to provide hard data with which to justify a decision. Administrators, recognizing how tenuous data can be, prefer that trustees make the decision on principle or politics. Both are legitimate views. What is needed is open understanding of which process is appropriate to which issue. Sadly, few issues allow easy sorting. In closure only an economic question? Must "gifted" programs be implemented only in reaction to political pressure? Is J.K. an educational issue, an economic imperative, or a social service? There is no easy solution to these dilemmas. Most policy issues are too multifaceted to be easily sorted into one category or the other.

Budgeting

Three questions arise from observations of the budget process. One, only in rare cases was there clear intent to evaluate impact of the expenditure — yet one can spend more money evaluating than a program costs.

Where is the best balance? Two, there is no method of measuring marginal utility. That is, when $100,000 remains to fund $200,000 worth of need, there is way to measure relative impact of each subsequent investment. Can educators be more economically rational, given the state of our technology? Third, some programs are, after all PB rationality has been applied, funded according to the persuasiveness of individual trustee supporters. Beyond limits this is dangerous, but the political interface is legitimate. Political rationality is not irrational; it is merely democratic.

Share of Control

As discussed earlier, real and perceived control over policy is high for administrators, trustees, and staff (forces). Trustees legal power is nearly absolute, but administrative influence is somewhat higher. Administrators most often define the questions and define the limit of alternatives. That is their legitimate role and it does not seem to be out of balance. This balance is due in part to the high level of involvement of informed trustees - and to an administrative staff which supports that involvement.

Community

There is little conscious nurturing of community input. School communities are given very little control over curriculum, staffing, school policies.

There is no broad-based, ongoing network of school "lobbies" to help trustees understand implications of their decisions. Trustees are elected "at large"; there is no ward system. Clearly this makes trustees less vulnerable. Is more input, or more vulnerability, desirable?

Picture a homogeneous community -- all parents are middle-class, white-collar "WASPS". All trustees are identical. So the representation looks like this in "Suburbanville".



FIGURE 8: STEREOTYPICAL HOMOGENEOUS COMMUNITY AND TRUSTEES

But in "Urbantown", there are seventeen major ethnic language groups, low, middle, and upper-class sections, and enormous variety in age, structure, services and needs. Ideally, the Urbantown board would reflect that diversity.



FIGURE 9: STEREOTYPICAL HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITY AND TRUSTEES

The Lakehead Board of Education trustees resemble Suburbanville in their relative homogeneity. Whether this is appropriate depends on one's perception of the community. During the period of the research, there was little evidence of the existance of local, community-based issues which were not being served. However, that may merely be a tribute to the effectiveness of the control system; there may be unmeasured need. The organization might benefit - might act in an anticipatory and proactive fashion - by measuring such hypothesized needs more carefully.

DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS

1. The study supports numerous others[11] which argue for a high level of control by administrative elites. But groups such as trustees and the "forces" also evidence high control. This supports Tannenbaum's (1966) argument that control is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Tannenbaum's further argument that organizations in which high levels of perceived control are found are often highly functioning organizations is also qualitatively supported.
2. Some of the cohesiveness within the organization seems to have been achieved at the expense of representativeness. That is, some of the structural and attitude systems of LBE cause insularity. This may exact a long-term cost from the organization which, at this point, is still relatively responsive to current needs. If there is not an assured political responsiveness, it would seem that extra attention should be paid to objective measures of client and community need. Neither is present to a degree which gives this observer confidence in the future ability of LBE to adapt to changing needs and demands of its clients. On the other hand, the attention to the needs of the system seems to have been successful, and this may have been an appropriate <u>first</u> priority in 1976.

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[11] Rourke's (1969) discussion, while somewhat one-sided, provides a thorough description of this phenomenon.

3. Thus, cohesiveness and control can become maladaptive if an organization (a) becomes hyperrational (Wise, 1977), or (b) pays too little attention to its environment. In spite of some evidence that (b) is a problem, the very high level of innovation belies that concern. How can this be? Weick (1976) suggests that a loosely coupled system adapts faster and more appropriately to localized stresses. A tightly coupled system (like The Lakehead Board of Education) is better able to adapt to system wide stress. The Lakehead Board of Education has very successfully coped with decline and restraint, two system-wide problems. It is in these areas that the highest levels of innovation are to be found.

   The other side of Weick's coin would raise a question regarding this organizations' ability to respond to more localized stress. The discussion immediately above suggesting some insularity from community demands and client needs is instructive in this context. Accepting coupling imagery, one would predict that such localized stresses exist and are not being addressed. The answer is empirical, and further research on this or similar organizations could be productive. The present study is potentially useful in that it suggests to future researchers some mechanisms that might be associated with tight coupling.

4. Traditional trustee fears that open-scope collective bargaining may allow "too much" teacher control are partly justified. The contract does constrain innovation and central control, but it also reduces uncertainty and provides a useful "fast track" for adaptive policy responses.

Single-team bargaining also enhances the quality of problem solutions and serves to ameliorate potential conflict or oberbalance by either party. In this organization, benefits appear to outweigh costs.

5. Declining resources and the small "victory" over the Province regarding Hillcrest suggest future conflict and increasing politization of policy issues as boards challenge the vulnerable minority government. An increase in coalitions and in proactive responses is very possible. Ontario may look much more like some U.S. states in future if interest group activity continues to increase, and if the vulnerability of the government remains unchanged. One might prescribe attention to cohesiveness among those interest groups which represent the education industry. In the vernacular, given a finite and diminishing fiscal pie, the education lobbies would de well to seek a larger piece, rather than fighting each other for the few discretionary crumbs. In a study of the Michigan Department of Education completed in 1975, this author found that kind of coalition building to be increasingly common and effective. (Nelson, 1976).
6. The network of multiple, redundant channels for policy development works. The LBE has fail-safe back-up systems in the same way that a N.A.S.A. moon vehicle does. If one problem-solving or policy-making channel fails, others are available and are used. The contract is a common second or third route (see discussion re "hybrids") used to respond to a critical need for an early policy decision, although the groundwork and analysis may have been developed within other routes. Surprisingly,

this network of multiple redundant channels serves to enrich problem-solving capacity rather than to slow down the process. One should beware of overly formalizing or bureaucratizing these effective processes.

7. While the organization is intendedly rational, and is believed to be moreso than its organizational peers, it is still necessary to react incrementally and often intuitively. For example, each response to decline taken alone is incremental, and while impressive, not earth-shattering. Yet taken together, these components are consistent: they do sum to an impressive whole. I believe this depends on that ethereal quality called "vision". For the reasons outlined above -- cohesiveness, history, novel conceptual frameworks, participation, low conflict; all levels of leadership share a roughly similar vision of the desired state of the organization. Much credit is due to the CEO's command of powerful conceptual frameworks, but a visionary alone is merely a lonely soothsayer. Trustees, administrators, and teacher leaders, operating within these structures, processes, and frameworks, act together to make the organization work well.

As one who generally prefers sociological or systems explanations of organizational outcomes, this author experiences some dissonance with regard to these findings. It is difficult to separate the impact of one motivated actor - in this case, the CEO-from influences of the system and the environment within which he operates. Clearly, the environment required

such behaviours. Certainly, it is clear that control mechanisms are not simply reflections of one persons charisma. Alternatively, the pervasiveness of the CEO's influence is documented. I will stop at that point, not out of surrender, but to provoke some thought about the probable inadequacy of any explanation of policy or practice which seeks to advance a single cause. Organizations are multivariate phenomena.

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